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Coordinating a Supply Chain With a
Manufacturer-Owned Online Channel: A Dual
Channel Model Under Price Competition
Jennifer K. Ryan, Daewon Sun, and Xuying Zhao
Abstract—We consider a dual channel supply chain in which a
manufacturer sells a single product to end-users through both a
traditional retail channel and a manufacturer-owned direct online
channel. We adopt a commonly used linear demand substitution
model in which the mean demand in each channel is a function of
the prices in each channel. We model each channel as a newsvendor
problem, with price and order quantity as decision variables. In ad-
dition, the manufacturer must choose the wholesale price to charge
to the independent retailer. We analyze the optimal decisions for
each channel and prove the existence of a unique equilibrium for
the system. We compare this equilibrium solution to the solution
for an integrated system, in which the manufacturer owns both the
online store and the retailer. To enable supply chain coordination,
we propose two contract schemes: a modified revenue-sharing con-
tract and gain/loss sharing contract. We show that, in cases where
the retail channel has a larger market than the online channel, such
contracts enable the manufacturer to maintain price discrimina-
tion, selling the products in different channels at different prices.
Finally, we perform a comprehensive numerical study to consider
the impact of the model parameters on the equilibrium and to
demonstrate the performance of the proposed coordination con-
tracts. We conclude that coordination is most critical for products
which are highly price sensitive and for systems in which the online
and traditional retail channels are not viewed as close substitutes.
Index Terms—Competition, coordination, eBusiness, game
theory, newsvendor problem with pricing, online direct channel.
I. INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION
THIS paper considers competition and coordination in aretail supply chain with dual channels of distribution. A
manufacturer distributes his products through both a traditional
(independent) retail channel, e.g., a department store, as well as
through a manufacturer-owned direct online channel. The past
two decades have seen rapid growth in online channels, for a
variety of reasons, including the development of the internet and
information technology and the growth of third-party logistics
providers [1], [2]. Adding a direct online channel has a num-
ber of advantages, such as increasing control over pricing and
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product selection, and enabling the manufacturer to reach a
wider segment of customers and to engage in price discrimina-
tion. Of course, adding an online channel also has a number of
potential disadvantages, including the introduction of competi-
tion into the system, which may lead to lower prices and po-
tentially reduced profits for both channels [3]. Understandably,
retailers often view manufacturer-owned direct online channels
as a competitive threat [2], [4].
While there has been significant previous literature weigh-
ing these advantages and disadvantages to consider the question
of whether or not it is beneficial for a manufacturer to add a
direct online channel, as well as assessing the impact of the
dual-channel approach on the retailer, little of this previous
literature addresses the obvious next questions: given that the
manufacturer has chosen to take a dual-channel approach to
distribute his product, how can the system be designed in order
to achieve supply-chain coordination? What kinds of mecha-
nisms can be designed to reduce or eliminate channel conflict?
Addressing these questions is the primary focus of this paper.
Thus, we focus our analysis on systems in which there already
exist dual channels of distribution, a traditional retail channel
and a manufacturer-owned direct online channel, e.g., HP, Dell,
Nike, and Apple. Because we consider a single period setting,
our model is particularly appropriate for apparel, publishing,
and electronics supply chains. As noted in [2] and [5], ap-
parel manufacturers such as Polo Ralph Lauren, DKNY, and Liz
Claiborne distribute their products through both manufacturer-
owned channels (outlet stores and, more recently, online stores)
as well as through major department store chains, such as Macy’s
and Kohl’s.
In this paper, we model the horizontal price competition be-
tween the manufacturer-owned direct channel and the traditional
retailer, and the vertical competition between the manufacturer
and the retailer (e.g., [6]). We seek to understand how the equi-
librium behavior of this supply chain will depend on a number
of problem parameters. We study the impact of price compe-
tition on the profits of each firm and we investigate methods
for achieving supply-chain coordination. As detailed in the next
section, we believe we are the first to consider the problem of
supply-chain coordination for a dual-channel supply chain in
which the direct and retail channels compete on price. We do
so in a setting in which demand is uncertain and in which both
channels must make both price and quantity decisions.
Specifically, we consider a dual-channel supply chain in
which demand in each channel is a random variable whose
expected value is a function of the prices charged in each
0018-9391/$31.00 © 2012 IEEE
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channel. Thus, the channels compete on price. In addition, de-
mand in each channel will depend on customers’ preferences
regarding purchasing online versus in a traditional retail setting.
For example, some customers may prefer the convenience and
lower search cost associated with the online channel, while other
customers may prefer the ability to immediately obtain the prod-
uct through the retail channel. To reflect this, we adopt a com-
monly used linear demand substitution model (e.g., [7]–[9]).
Given the uncertainty in demand, each channel’s decision prob-
lem can be formulated as a newsvendor problem in which both
price and order quantity are decision variables. In addition, the
manufacturer sets the wholesale price.
Our equilibrium analysis is composed of multiple steps. First,
for a given wholesale price, we characterize the Nash equilib-
rium decisions for the system, i.e., we determine the equilibrium
price and quantity decisions for each channel and, under certain
conditions, prove the existence of a unique equilibrium for the
system. Next, we formulate a Stackelberg game to consider the
manufacturer’s choice of the wholesale price. We then study the
equilibrium behavior of the system as a function of the problem
parameters. We also compare this equilibrium solution to the
solution for an integrated system, in which the manufacturer
owns both the direct channel and the retailer. Given the solution
to the integrated system, we propose a modified revenue-sharing
contract, in which the manufacturer imposes a minimum retail
price on the retailer, to enable supply-chain coordination.
In cases where the retail channel has a larger market than
the online channel, such a contract enables the manufacturer to
maintain a minimum price differential between the retailer and
the online store, which helps to achieve price discrimination. In
addition, we show that a gain/loss (GL) sharing contract can be
used to coordinate the system. Finally, through a comprehensive
numerical study, we consider how the equilibrium varies with
the key model parameters and demonstrate that the proposed co-
ordination contracts can improve the system’s profit by 12.44%,
on average, for 1080 problems tested.
The main contribution of this paper is the development of co-
ordination schemes for a dual-channel system under price com-
petition and demand uncertainty. As noted in the next section,
while several authors have considered the problem of competi-
tion between online and traditional retail channels, to the best
of our knowledge, none have considered coordination when the
channels compete on price. In addition, we introduce a new mod-
ification to the classic revenue-sharing contract, which imposes
a minimum retail price.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
We next review the literature on competition in supply chains
with multiple channels of distribution. While we focus on com-
petition between a manufacturer-owned direct channel and an
independent retailer, our research has some similarities to the
literature on competition in a single supplier, n-retailer sup-
ply chain. While much of this literature considers retailers who
compete only on inventory (e.g., [10]–[12]), the most relevant
papers for our purpose are those in which demand is stochastic
and the locations compete on price (e.g., [13] and [14]), or on
both price and inventory (e.g., [9] and [15]).
A. Competition Between Direct and Retail Channels
We next review the literature on dual-channel supply chains
in which the manufacturer sells directly to the end-users, either
through online sales or through a manufacturer-owned store,
as well as through an independent retailer. Unless specifically
mentioned (e.g., [2] and [3]), none of these papers considers
supply-chain coordination, the primary focus of this paper. The
most relevant papers are those that consider dual channels that
compete on price; most of these, however, do not consider
production/order quantity decisions. For example, Dumrongsiri
et al. [16] assume that the manufacturer fills direct sales demand
on a make-to-order basis and must always fill the retailer’s order.
Thus, the manufacturer’s production quantity is not a decision
variable. Chiang et al. [1] assume the market share for each
channel is a deterministic function of the prices and thus there
is no quantity decision. Cattani et al. [4] also consider a dual-
channel model in which the market share is deterministic. Like
us, they use a Stackelberg game model with the manufacturer as
leader and retailer as follower. Bell et al. [17] consider the im-
pact of the introduction of a manufacturer-owned channel on the
pricing strategies of the existing retailers under the assumption
that demand is a deterministic function of prices and marketing
effort.
The aforementioned papers, as well as this paper, all take re-
tail price as a decision variable, and thus, the channels compete
on price. Other research on manufacturer–retailer competition
in dual-channel supply chains takes price as fixed. Here, the
locations may compete on inventory or on other factors such
as sales effort. The authors in [3] and [18] seek to coordinate a
system in which the channels compete only on inventory. The
authors in [2] and [19] consider a manufacturer who sells his
product through one of three systems: retailer-only, direct sales-
only, or a system with both retail and direct sales. Tsay and
Agrawal [2] consider the impact of sales effort, while Hender-
shott and Zhang [19] consider the impact of search costs. Tsay
and Agrawal [2] use their model to study channel coordination
mechanisms, including a wholesale pricing scheme and two
referral schemes.
B. Supply-Chain Coordination
In a single-channel supply chain, with one manufacturer and
one retailer, operating under a wholesale price contract, it is
known that the retailer will order less than the system optimal
quantity. When demand is not dependent on retail price, several
contract types have been shown to coordinate the supply chain
and to arbitrarily divide its profit: buy back [20], revenue shar-
ing [21], quantity flexibility [22], [23], sales rebate [24], [25],
and quantity discount [26]. With price-dependent demand, a key
question is whether contracts that coordinate the order quantity
also coordinate the pricing decision. It is known that buy back,
quantity flexibility, and sales-rebate contracts do not coordi-
nate in this setting, while revenue sharing and quantity discount
contracts achieve coordination under certain conditions [27].
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A second segment of this literature considers coordination
with multiple retailers. Research in this area includes a buyback
contract to coordinate newsvendors who compete on both price
and inventory [9], a wholesale price contract to coordinate retail-
ers who compete only on inventory [28], a revenue-sharing con-
tract to coordinate retailers who compete on quantity [21], and
coordinating retailers who compete on price [14]. Cachon [29]
provides a review of this literature.
One of the coordination contracts considered in this paper is
the revenue-sharing contract. Numerous authors have consid-
ered this type of contract (e.g., [30]–[32]). We also consider a
GL sharing contract, which is commonly observed in practice,
although there are very few papers studying contracts of this
form (e.g., [33]–[35]). In some industries, GL sharing contracts
are referred to as profit-sharing contracts. Weinstein [36] ex-
amines profit-sharing contracts in the motion picture industry.
In the supply-chain literature, Wang and Webster [5] investi-
gate the GL sharing contract in a decentralized supply chain
including one manufacturer and one loss-averse retailer. They
show that such a contract can coordinate the supply chain under
certain conditions.
A final segment of the literature considers a manufacturer
who owns a direct sales channel, which competes with a tradi-
tional retail channel. Here, the supply chain experiences both
vertical (between manufacturer and retailer) and horizontal (be-
tween direct channel and traditional retail channel) competition.
Coordination in this setting has received little attention. Boy-
aci [3] shows that if the selling prices are fixed, the price-only,
buy-back, rebate, and revenue-sharing contracts cannot coordi-
nate the supply chain. Boyaci proposes a new type of contract,
the compensation-commission contract, which can coordinate
the system. Tsay and Agrawal [2] also consider this context, but
assume deterministic demand (which is influenced by sales ef-
fort) and fixed prices. If the selling prices are decision variables
and demands are price dependent, then coordination is challeng-
ing because it requires the price and inventory decisions in each
channel to be system-optimal. Coordination in this environment,
in which the supply chain experiences both horizontal and ver-
tical competition, and in which the decision-makers must make
both pricing and quantity decisions, is the focus of this paper.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to study this prob-
lem, and the first to provide contracts which can coordinate the
system and arbitrarily allocate profits between the manufacturer
and retailer.
III. MODEL FORMULATION AND ANALYSIS:
DETERMINISTIC DEMAND
We consider a supply chain consisting of a manufacturer
(he), which we denote with the subscript M , who distributes
his product through two channels: an independently owned and
operated retailer (she), which we denote with the subscript R,
and a manufacturer-owned online store, which we denote with
the subscript O. Demand through each channel is dependent on
the prices charged in both channels. Each channel must make
both pricing and quantity decisions, while the manufacturer also
sets the wholesale price charged to the retailer.
Since our goal is to investigate the impact of manufacturer-
owned online stores in a competitive market environment, our
demand model must adequately reflect the substitutability of the
two channels. Thus, we adopt a typical linear demand substi-
tution model. If we let DR (pR , pO ) (DO (pR , pO )) denote the
total market demand seen by the retailer (online store) given the
prices charged by the retailer pR and the online store pO , we
can write
DR (pR , pO ) = δR − αR · pR + βR · pO (1)
DO (pR , pO ) = δO − αO · pO + βO · pR . (2)
The parameters αi and βi , i ∈ {R,O}, represent the own-price
and cross-price sensitivities of demand. Generally, one would
expect the retail demand to be more sensitive to the retail price
than to the online price. Similarly, the online demand would be
more sensitive to the online price than to the retail price. This
would imply αR > βR and αO > βO . Also, δi represents the
base market size and captures the customers’ base utility gained
from purchasing through channel i. The parameter βi captures
the substitutability between the two channels, i.e., higher values
of βi imply that the channels are viewed as closer substitutes.
Thus, δi and βi will depend on the customers’ preferences re-
garding purchasing online versus in a traditional retail setting.
For example, some customers may prefer the convenience and
lower search cost associated with the online channel, while other
customers may prefer the ability to immediately obtain the prod-
uct through the retail channel. The value of βi , in particular, will
reflect this tradeoff.
We now outline the sequence of events for our model and
define some additional notation.
1) Prior to the start of the selling season, the manufacturer
sets the wholesale price cR charged to the retailer.
2) The retailer sets the retail price pR and orders QR from
the manufacturer at the wholesale price of cR per unit.
3) At the same time, the manufacturer sets the online store
price pO and chooses a production quantity to be shipped
to the online store QO .
4) The manufacturer produces QM = QR + QO , with unit
production cost of cM . We assume unlimited capacity at
the manufacturer. Thus, the manufacturer is always able
to produce the full quantity QM in time for the start of the
selling season.
5) End-user demands occur simultaneously at the retailer and
the online store.
We first derive the best response function for the retailer
given the price for the manufacturer, i.e., we characterize the
optimal pR for a given value of pO . Since, given the prices,
demand is known with certainty, the retailer will choose to
order a quantity QR just equal to demand. Thus, given pO ,
the expected profit for the retailer ΠR is ΠR (pR |pO ) = (pR −
cR )QR , and the retailer will choose pR to maximize ΠR (pR |pO )
subject to QR = δR − αR · pR + βR · pO . It is easy to show that
ΠR (pR |pO ) is concave in pR and that the optimal retail price is
pR (pO ) = δR +αR cR +βR pO2αR .
We next characterize the manufacturer’s best response func-
tion given the retailer’s price, taking the wholesale price as
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fixed. Later, we will consider how the manufacturer chooses
the optimal wholesale price. Since, given the prices, demand
is known with certainty, the retailer will choose to order
a quantity QR just equal to demand. Thus, given pR , we
can write the expected profit for the manufacturer ΠM as
ΠM (pO |pR ) = (pO − cM )QO + (cR − cM )QR , and the man-
ufacturer will choose pO to maximize ΠM (pO |pR ) subject
to QO = δO − αO · pO + βO · pR . It is easy to show that
ΠM (pO |pR ) is concave in pO and that the optimal retail prices
is p∗R (pO ) =
δO +αO cM +βO pR +(cR −cM )βR
2αO
. We next note that,
since both profit functions are strictly concave in price, for a
given wholesale price cR , a unique equilibrium exists for the
game between the retailer and manufacturer. Thus, the equilib-
rium prices can be found at the intersection of the best response
functions, and can be written as follows:
p∗R =
(
βR
4αOαR − βOβR
)
[δO + αOcM + (cR − cM )βR ]
+
(
2αO
4αOαR − βOβR
)
[δR + αRcR ] (3)
p∗O =
(
βO
4αOαR − βOβR
)
[δR + αRcR ]
+
(
2αR
4αOαR − βOβR
)
[δO + αOcM + (cR − cM )βR ].
(4)
Notice that in order to have p∗R ≥ 0 and p∗O ≥ 0, we require
4αOαR − βOβR > 0. This condition will be satisfied if αR >
βR and αO > βO , i.e., if the retail demand is more sensitive
to the retail price than to the online price and, similarly, if the
online demand is more sensitive to the online price than to the
retail price.
We next consider how the manufacturer will set the wholesale
price for the retailer. To answer this question, we consider a
Stackelberg game between the manufacturer and retailer. In this
game, the manufacturer sets the wholesale price taking into
consideration the equilibrium prices, i.e., we are interested in
the value of cR that maximizes the manufacturer’s profits, given
p∗R and p∗O . By checking the second-order conditions, it is easy
to show that the manufacturer’s profits will be concave in cR ,
and thus, there will exist a unique optimal cR , as long as αi > βi
and αj > βi for all i ∈ {R,O} and i ∈ {R,O}. Unfortunately,
while we can obtain a closed-form expression for the optimal cR
(see the online Supplementary Material), the exact expression
is quite complex. However, if we consider a symmetric setting
with δR = δO = δ, αR = αO = α, and βR = βO = β, we can
simplify the expression for the optimal cR to the following:
c∗R =
(8α3 + β3)δ + (α− β)(8α3 + 2αβ − β3)cM
2α(α− β)(8α2 + β2) . (5)
We next present sensitivity analysis for this symmetric model
with deterministic demand.
Theorem 1: Suppose δR = δO = δ, αR = αO = α, andβR =
βO = β. Then, if α > β:
1) QR is decreasing in pR and increasing in pO . Similarly, QO
is decreasing in pO and increasing in pR . 2) The equilibriums
QR and QO are increasing in β and decreasing in α. 3) The
equilibrium pR is increasing in β and decreasing in α. 4) The
equilibrium cR is increasing in cM . 5) The equilibrium ΠR
increases in β and decreases in α.
All proofs are provided in the online Supplement Material.
The proof of Theorem 1 contains expressions for the equilib-
rium prices, order quantities, and profits. The condition α > β
implies that each channels’ demand is more sensitive to its own
price than to the other channel’s price.
The results of Theorem 1 are intuitive. Point 1 says that the
optimal order quantity in each channel is decreasing in its own
price, but increasing in the other channel’s price. Point 2 says
that the equilibrium order quantity in each channel is decreas-
ing in its own-price sensitivity and increasing in the competitor-
price sensitivity. Point 3 says that the equilibrium retail price
is decreasing in its own-price sensitivity and increasing in the
competitor-price sensitivity. Point 4 says that the equilibrium
wholesale price charged to the retailer is increasing in the man-
ufacturer’s unit production costs. Point 5 says that the retailer’s
equilibrium profit is decreasing in its own-price sensitivity and
increasing in the competitor-price sensitivity.
Finally, we consider how this system can be coordinated, i.e.,
we consider the type of contract that can make the decentralized
system perform as well as an integrated system, in which the
manufacturer owns both the retailer and the online channel. For
this deterministic model, it is straightforward to see that a profit-
sharing contract can coordinate the system. In such a contract,
the manufacturer sets the wholesale price at cR = cM . Then,
at the end of the selling season, the retailer keeps φ percent of
the total system profit, while the manufacturer receives 1− φ
percent of the total system profit. Given that coordination can
be achieved for our deterministic model, we have the following
result.
Theorem 2: Suppose δR = δO = δ, αR = αO = α, andβR =
βO = β. Then, the retail and online prices in the coordinated
(integrated) system are lower than the equilibrium retail and
online prices in the decentralized system.
Theorem 2 indicates that coordination not only improves the
overall system profit, but also makes the consumer better off by
lowering the prices on both channels.
Finally, we note that a profit-sharing contract will require both
parties to honestly share cost and profit information, which may
create difficulties in implementation. In addition, when demand
is stochastic, as in the next section, coordination is more difficult.
However, we propose two contracts that coordinate the system
and that are relatively easy to implement in practice.
IV. MODEL FORMULATION AND ANALYSIS:
STOCHASTIC DEMAND
We next extend the model considered in Section III to the case
of uncertain demand so that we may use the model to capture the
critical tradeoff between overstocking and understocking. To do
so, we will use an additive model of uncertainty (see, e.g., [37])
and thus our demand functions can be rewritten as follows:
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DR (pR , pO ) = δR − αR · pR + βR · pO + R (6)
DO (pR , pO ) = δO − αO · pO + βO · pR + O (7)
where i , i ∈ {R,O}, is a random variable defined on the range
[Ai,Bi ]. We let fi(·) and Fi(·) denote the probability density
function and cumulative distribution function of i , with mean
μi and standard deviation σi . To ensure that, for all values of
pj , there exists some range of pi for which Di(pi, pj ) > 0, we
require Ai > −δi , for all i ∈ {R,O}.
The sequence of events in this model is identical to that in
Section III, with the additional assumption that, at the end of
the selling season, any excess inventory is salvaged with values
vR and vO per unit at the retailer and online store, respec-
tively. In addition, as noted previously, like much of the liter-
ature on supply-chain coordination, we assume a single-period
newsvendor setting, and thus, our model will be most applica-
ble for products with a short life cycle. Finally, to simplify the
analysis, it is useful to write QR = δR − αRpR + βRpO + zR
and QO = δO − αOpO + βOpR + zO , where zi represents the
amount of safety stock held at location i, i ∈ {R,O}. With this
reformulation, the decision variables for each player are (zi, pi),
i ∈ {R,O}.
A. Retailer’s Best Response Function
We first derive the best response function for the retailer, i.e.,
we characterize the optimal pR and zR for given values of pO
and zO . We can write the expected profit for the retailer ΠR as
ΠR (pR ,QR |pO , zO ) = E (−cRQR + pRmin[DR,QR ]
+ vRmax[QR −DR, 0]) .
We can now apply the results obtained by Petruzzi and
Dada [37], henceforth denoted as P&D. Specifically, our prob-
lem is the same as P&D, Section 1.1, but with the follow-
ing notation: h = −vR , s = 0, μ = μR, a = δR + βRpO , b =
αR, c = cR ,A = AR, and B = BR . Thus, Lemma 1 and The-
orem 1 in P&D apply and we can write the optimal pR given zR
and pO as follows:
p∗R (zR |pO ) = p0R (pO )−
ΘR (zR )
2αR
(8)
where ΘR (zR ) =
∫ BR
zR
(R − zR )fR (R )dR and p0R (pO ) =
δR +αR cR +βR pO +μR
2αR
is the optimal riskless price, which depends
on the price charged by the online channel. Notice that this opti-
mal price for the retailer depends only on the price at the online
store, not on the order quantity.
We can plug p∗R (zR |pO ) back into the profit function to get the
profit as a function of just zR , i.e., we can convert the retailer’s
2-D strategy space into a single dimension, which will simplify
our analysis. We apply Theorem 1 in P&D, which provides
conditions under which there is a unique solution to the first-
order condition for zR .
1) FR (·) should satisfy the following: 2rR (zR )2 +
drR (zR )
dzR
> 0 for all AR ≤ zR < BR , where rR (zR ) =
fR (zR )
1−FR (zR ) is the hazard rate.
2) The demand and cost parameters must satisfy: δR +
βRpO − αRcR + AR > 0.
The first condition will be satisfied for a variety of dis-
tributions, including the normal and log-normal. For the
second condition, notice that, for any reasonable pR and
pO , we should require DR ≥ 0. This implies that δR +
βRpO − αRpR + AR > 0. We also require pR > cR . Thus,
we can safely assume that δR − αRcR + βRpO + AR > δR −
αRpR + βRpO + AR ≥ 0, and under reasonable conditions, the
second condition should hold.
Finally, from Theorem 1 in P&D, we have the first-order
condition for zR
∂ΠR
∂zR
= −(cR − vR ) +
(
p0R (pO )− vR −
ΘR (zR )
2αR
)
× (1− FR (zR )) = 0. (9)
Let z∗R (pO ) denote the value of zR that satisfies this condition
for a given pO . Given z∗R (pO ), the retailer’s order quantity can
be written as Q∗R = δR − αRp∗R (zO ) + βRpO + z∗R (pO ).
B. Manufacturer’s Best Response Function
We will first analyze the manufacturer’s problem taking the
wholesale price as fixed and deriving the best response function
for the manufacturer given the price and order quantity for the
retailer, i.e., we characterize the optimal pO and zO for given
values of pR and zR . To do so, we can write the expected profits
for the manufacturer ΠM , given pR and zR , as follows:
ΠM (pO ,QO |pR , zR ) = E (cRQR − cM QM
+ pOmin[DO ,QO ] + vOmax[QO −DO , 0])
where QM = QO + QR . Although the manufacturer’s profit
has additional terms to capture manufacturing costs and revenue
from the retailer, its form is the same as the retailer’s profit. Thus,
we have the following optimal online price as a function of zO
and pR :
p∗O (zO |pR ) = p0O (pR )−
ΘO (zO )
2αO
(10)
where ΘO (zO ) =
∫ BO
zO
(O − zO )fO (O )dO and p0O (pR ) =
δO +αO cM +βO pR +(cR −cM )βR +μO
2αO
is the optimal riskless price.
Finally, the first-order conditions for zO are
∂ΠM
∂zO
= −(cM − vO ) +
(
p0O (pR )− vO −
ΘO (zO )
2αO
)
× (1− FO (zO )) = 0. (11)
Let z∗O (pR ) denote the value of zO that satisfies this condition
for a given pR . Given z∗O (pR ), the retailer’s order quantity can
be written as Q∗O = δO − αOp∗O (pR ) + βOpR + z∗O (pR ). The
conditions needed to guarantee that there is a unique solution
to the first-order condition for zO are analogous to those for the
retailer and are not repeated here.
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C. Equilibrium Analysis
We next show that, for a given wholesale price cR , the game
between the retailer and manufacturer is supermodular and thus
an equilibrium exists. In addition, under certain conditions, this
equilibrium is unique. We start by noting that any equilibrium
must satisfy the first-order conditions, which define the players’
best response functions, specified in (8)–(11). Next, using (8)
and (10), we can jointly solve for the prices for any given values
of zR and zO
p∗R (zO , zR ) =
(
βR
4αOαR − βOβR
)
[δO + αOcM + μO
+ (cR − cM )βR −ΘO (zO )]
+
(
2αO
4αOαR − βOβR
)
× [δR + αRcR + μR −ΘR (zR )] (12)
p∗O (zO , zR ) =
(
βO
4αOαR − βOβR
)
× [δR + αRcR + μR −ΘR (zR )]
+
(
2αR
4αOαR − βOβR
)
[δO + αOcM + μO
+ (cR − cM )βR −ΘO (zO )]. (13)
Given the game defined by (9) and (11)–(13), we can now prove
the following result.
Theorem 3: If 4αOαR − βOβR > 0, then the game between
the retailer and manufacturer is a supermodular game. Thus,
there exists at least one equilibrium.
The proof of Theorem 3 shows that the profit functions have
increasing differences in zR and zO , i.e., satisfy ∂
2 Π i
∂ zR ∂zO
≥ 0, for
i ∈ {R,O} [38]. This result implies that the decision variables
are complements, i.e., an increase in zO will cause the retailer to
want to increase (or not decrease) zR . The condition 4αOαR −
βOβR > 0 will be satisfied if αR > βR and αO > βO , which, as
discussed in Section III, is likely to hold. We next demonstrate
that, under certain conditions, the equilibrium will be unique.
Theorem 4: A unique Nash equilibrium exists under the fol-
lowing conditions:
1) 4αOαR − βOβR > 0, cR > vR , and cM > vO ;
2) 2ri(zi)2 + dri (zi )dzi > 0, i ∈ {R,O};
3) δi − αici + Ai > 0, i ∈ {R,O}.
While the condition in Theorem 3 guarantees the existence
of an equilibrium, the additional conditions in Theorem 4 guar-
antee that the equilibrium will be unique. If these conditions are
not satisfied, the profit functions ΠR and ΠM may not be uni-
modal, and thus there could potentially be multiple equilibria.
In that case, it becomes difficult to make specific predictions
regarding the behavior of the system equilibrium in practice.
Finally, we can show the following properties of the equilib-
rium solution.
Theorem 5: Under the conditions specified in Theorem 4: 1)
z∗R is nonincreasing in cR , while z∗O is nondecreasing in cR ; 2)
z∗R is nondecreasing in vR ; and 3) z∗O is nonincreasing in cM .
The first result indicates that safety stock at the retailer (online
store) decreases (increases) as the wholesale price increases.
The second result says that, as expected, as the salvage value
increases, the retailer’s safety stock will increase. The third
result also confirms our intuition that the online store’s safety
stock decreases as the production cost increases.
D. Setting the Wholesale Price
We next consider a Stackelberg game between the manu-
facturer and retailer to characterize the equilibrium wholesale
price. Thus, we are interested in the value of cR that maximizes
the manufacturers profits, given the equilibrium price and order
quantities, p∗R ,Q∗R , p∗O ,Q∗O . We start by proving the existence
of a Stackelberg equilibrium:
Theorem 6: There exists a Stackelberg equilibrium for the
game in which the manufacturer chooses the wholesale price cR
to maximize his own profits given (p∗R , z∗R , p∗O , z∗O ).
The proof of Theorem 6 follows [39], i.e., existence of an
equilibrium cR is guaranteed due to the fact that 1) the profit
functions are real valued and continuous and 2) the strategy
spaces are compact. This result only guarantees the existence
of an equilibrium for the Stackelberg game, but says nothing
about the uniqueness of such an equilibrium. While we are
unable to prove uniqueness, our numerical results indicate that
the equilibrium cR appears to be unique. Specifically, to find
the equilibrium cR , we must solve a system of equations. The
value of cR that satisfies this system of equations appears to be
unique.
To find the cR chosen by the manufacturer to maximize his
own profits given (p∗R , z∗R , p∗O , z∗O ), we write the first-order con-
dition, ∂ΠM∂cR = 0
∂ΠM
∂cR
=
∂pO
∂cR
(δO − αOpO + βOpR + zO ) + (pO − cO )
×
(
−αO ∂pO
∂cR
+ βO
∂pR
∂cR
+
∂zO
∂cR
)
− ∂pO
∂cR
∫ zO
AO
(zO − O )f(O )dO
− (pO − vO )∂zO
∂cR
FO (zO )
+ (δR − αRpR + βRpO + zR ) + (cR − cM )
×
(
−αR ∂pR
∂cR
+ βR
∂pO
∂cR
+
∂zR
∂cR
)
= 0. (14)
Since we do not have closed-form solutions for the equilibrium
prices and quantities at the retailer and manufacturer, we use the
implicit function theorem to write the partial derivatives of pR ,
pO , zR , and zO with respect to cR . A more detailed discussion
of our solution approach for finding the optimal wholesale price
c∗R can be found in the online Supplement Material.
V. INTEGRATED SYSTEM AND SUPPLY-CHAIN COORDINATION
We are interested in understanding how this dual-channel sup-
ply chain can be coordinated. We start by analyzing an integrated
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system in which the manufacturer owns both the retailer and the
online channel. We then propose two contracting schemes to
achieve coordination.
A. Integrated System
We consider an integrated system under the assumption that
the manufacturer owns both the retailer and the online store.
Prior to observing demand, the manufacturer chooses the pro-
duction quantities and prices for each location. Demand is then
observed and any excess demand at each location is salvaged.
The total system profit, ΠIS (pO , pR ,QO ,QR ), for the integrated
system can be written as
ΠIS = E(−cM QM + pOmin[DO ,QO ] + pRmin[DR,QR ]
+ vRmax[QR −DR, 0] + vOmax[QO −DO , 0])
= (pR − cM )(δR − αRpR + βRpO + zR )− (pR − vR )
×
∫ zR
AR
(zR − R )fR (R )dR
+ (pO − cM )(δO − αOpO + βOpR + zO )− (pO − vO )
×
∫ zO
AO
(zO − O )fO (O )dO . (15)
In the following, we characterize the optimal solution of the
integrated system.
Theorem 7: If the following conditions are met, the expected
profit for the integrated system is unimodal (quasi-concave)
and the optimal prices (pIR and pIO ) and order quantities (QIR
and QIO ) can be found as the unique solution to the first-order
conditions:
1) 4αRαO − (βR + βO )2 > 0;
2) cM > vi , i = R,O;
3) 2ri(zi)2 + dri (zi )zi > 0, i = R,O;
4) δi − αicM + Ai > 0, i = R,O.
To understand the first condition, consider the case in which
βR = βO = β. In this case, the first condition in the theorem
will hold if αR > β and αO > β, i.e., if each channel’s demand
is more sensitive to its own price than to the other channel’s
price. Conditions 3 and 4 of the theorem are analogous to the
conditions for unimodality required in Sections IV-A and IV-B.
Theorem 7 indicates that the integrated systems has a unique
optimal solution. As shown in the proof of the theorem, the
optimal prices for the integrated system, given zR and zO , are
pIR (zR , zO ) =
(
βR + βO
4αRαO − (βR + βO )2
)
× {δO + (αO − βR )cM + μO −ΘO (zO )}
+
(
2αO
4αRαO − (βR + βO )2
)
× {δR + (αR − βO )cM + μr −ΘR (zR )}
pIO (zR , zO ) =
(
2αR
4αRαO − (βR + βO )2
)
× {δO + (αO − βR )cM + μO −ΘO (zO )}
+
(
βR + βO
4αRαO − (βR + βO )2
)
× {δR + (αR − βO )cM + μr −ΘR (zR )}.
It is difficult to analytically compare the pIR and pIO . However,
our numerical study indicates that whether or not pIR > pIO will
depend on the parameters of the model.
Finally, we compare the optimal solution for the integrated
system with the Nash equilibrium solution for the decentralized
system. As discussed in detail in Section VI-B, our numerical re-
sults indicate that p∗R > pIR , p∗O > pIO , z∗R < zIR , and z∗O > zIO .
The results for the prices match the deterministic model results,
as given in Theorem 2. These differences can be attributed to the
inefficiencies caused by both horizontal price competition and
vertical double marginalization. Therefore, we next investigate
two methods for achieving supply-chain coordination.
B. Coordination Using a Modified Revenue-Sharing Contract
Having analyzed the equilibrium behavior for the dual-
channel model and having characterized the optimal system
behavior for the integrated system, we now investigate a con-
tracting scheme that will enable supply-chain coordination.
Specifically, we consider a modified revenue-sharing contract
in which the retailer shares a fixed portion of her revenue with
the manufacturer. Under this contract, defined by the parameters
(pIR , p
I
O , φ), the manufacturer imposes a minimum retail price
pIR on the retailer, i.e., the retailer may choose to price at any
level pR ≥ pIR , and the manufacturer sets his own online price
at pIO . Then, at the start of the selling season, the retailer chooses
her order quantity QR for which the manufacturer charges the
unit wholesale price cR = φcM . Then, at the end of the selling
season, the retailer keeps a fraction φ of her revenue and gives a
fraction (1− φ) of her revenue to the manufacturer. We call this
contract a minimum retail-price-constrained revenue-sharing
contract.
The minimum retail price constraint is commonly observed
in practice. Lynette [40] studied 203 resale price maintenance
cases and found that approximately 80% of the cases involved
a minimum resale price requirement specified by the manufac-
turers to reduce price competition among the retailers. In the
bicycle industry, some suppliers have been known to enforce
minimum pricing, although not overtly [41]. In the automotive
industry, car manufacturers have a long history of specifying
a “manufacturer suggested retail price.” They are now consid-
ering efforts to enforce the minimum retail price [42]. In the
video game industry, Nintendo has been known to occasionally
institute minimum price requirements [43]. Similar minimum
price requirements are common for electronic goods, software,
books, and pharmaceuticals.1
Minimum retail price constraint makes intuitive sense in a
dual-channel supply chain in which the manufacturer distributes
products through a traditional retailer and a manufacturer-owned
online store. In such a system, the manufacturer will likely be
1
“Century-Old Ban Lifted on Minimum Retail Pricing,” by S. Labaton, New
York Times, 06/29/2007 and “Justices Hear Arguments About Pacts on Pricing,”
by L. Greenhouse, New York Times, 06/27/2007.
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interested in ensuring that the retailer does not undercut his
price or, going even further, he may be interested in maintaining
price discrimination, i.e., ensuring that the retail price is strictly
greater than the online price. Our numerical study results indi-
cate that the minimum price-constrained revenue-sharing con-
tract enables this sort of price discrimination for cases in which
the retail channel has a larger market than the online channel,
i.e., when δR ≥ δO .
To analyze this contract, we first show that, when the manu-
facturer imposes a minimum retail price, the retailer will always
choose to price at exactly this minimum level.
Theorem 8: Under the revenue-sharing contract defined by
(pIR , p
I
O , φ), where pIR is the minimum retail price imposed
by the manufacturer, the retailer will always choose to price
at pIR .
To understand this result, note that if the retailer operated
under a revenue-sharing contract with no constraint on her price,
given that the online channel prices at pIO , her optimal price
would be less than pIR . Since her profit is unimodal in price,
under the minimum price contract, the retailer would choose
to set her price equal to the minimum level, pIR . We also note
that this result does not require any assumptions regarding the
size of pIR relative to pIO , i.e., we do not require pIR > pIO .
Finally, this result coincides with what is generally observed
in practice, i.e., when manufacturers impose a minimum retail
price on their retailers, the retailers generally choose to set their
price at exactly that minimum level [44].
We can now demonstrate that a revenue-sharing contract of
the form described previously can coordinate the supply chain.
We first define the following notation: let Π∗R (Π∗M ) denote the
retailer’s (manufacturer’s) optimal expected profit without the
revenue-sharing contract, when cR = c∗R , the optimal wholesale
price for the decentralized dual-channel model, and let ΠIR (ΠIM )
denote the retailer’s (manufacturer’s) expected profit if both
parties use the optimal solution for the integrated system, when
cR = cM .
Theorem 9: When cR = φcM , the revenue-sharing con-
tract defined by (pIR , pIO , φ) coordinates the dual-channel
model. If φ ∈
[
Π∗R
ΠI
R
,
ΠIR +Π
I
M −Π∗M
ΠI
R
]
, the contract will be Pareto-
improving.
As shown in the proof of Theorem 9, the Pareto-improving
region for φ is always nonempty, i.e., there always exists some
value of φ that makes both parties better-off.
Next, we note that, depending on the relationships among
Π∗R , Π
I
R , Π
∗
M , and ΠIM , the parameter φ may be larger than 1,
as discussed in the following.
1) When ΠIR ≤ Π∗R , a feasible φ will always be greater than
or equal to 1. In this case, the integrated system provides
no benefit to the retailer over the decentralized system.
Therefore, in order to motivate the retailer to participate,
the manufacturer must share some of the benefits he ob-
tains from the integrated system with the retailer. Thus,
the revenue-sharing contract is similar in concept to a re-
bate contract, in which the retailer pays a wholesale price
larger than cM and then claims some refund for each item
sold.
2) When ΠIR > Π∗R and ΠIM > Π∗M , a feasible φ may be
greater than 1, depending on the negotiating power of
each party, e.g., when the retailer has more negotiating
power, we would expect her to extract more of the system
profits and thus φ may exceed 1.
3) When ΠIR > Π∗R and ΠIM ≤ Π∗M , a feasible φ will always
be less than or equal to 1, as in a traditional revenue-
sharing contract. In this case, the integrated system pro-
vides no benefit to the manufacturer over the decentral-
ized system. Therefore, in order to motivate the manufac-
turer to participate, the retailer must share some of the
benefits she obtains from the integrated system with the
manufacturer.
While the value of φ may theoretically be greater than 1, in
our numerical results, as described in Section VI, the Pareto-
improving region for φ ranged from 15% to 51%.
1) Implementation and Legal Considerations: The mini-
mum price-constrained revenue-sharing contract proposed here
is different from what is known as a “minimum resale price
maintenance contract.” In Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D.
Park and Sons (1911), the Supreme Court found that mini-
mum resale price maintenance contracts violate the Sherman
Antitrust Act [45]. However, that ruling has been a source of
debate (see [46] and [47]). In a June 2007 ruling, the Supreme
Court overturned Dr. Miles, concluding that vertical price re-
straints are not illegal across the board, but must be judged on
an individual basis. The ruling came in the case Leegin Creative
Leather Products,2 a manufacturer of fashion accessories, who
wanted to target customers willing to pay a higher price for extra
service. The company instituted a policy that required retailers
to adhere to a minimum price and refused to sell to the retailer
who filed suit because that retailer sold goods at prices below
the manufacturer’s minimum price.
Thus, in a minimum resale price maintenance contract, the
manufacturer refuses to sell products to a retailer if the re-
tailer does not accept and execute the minimum retail price.
Our proposed contract is different because the retailer is given
two options: 1) she could buy from the manufacturer under
the existing wholesale price contract or 2) she may participate
in the price-constrained revenue-sharing contract. In order to
increase his profits, the manufacturer seeks to motivate the re-
tailer to choose option 2). Therefore, the manufacturer designs
the revenue-sharing contract in a manner that is beneficial to the
retailer, i.e., so that the profits earned by the retailer under 2)
are at least as high as under 1).
Finally, since the prices charged by both channels under the
minimum price-constrained revenue-sharing contract are equal
to the optimal prices for the integrated system, these prices
will likely be less than those charged without the contract, i.e.,
pIR < p
∗
R and pIO < p∗O . Thus, consumers are likely to be better
off under the proposed contract. This fact may be a compelling
argument for the courts to consider when evaluating the legality
of price maintenance contracts.
2See http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/06pdf/06-480.pdf.
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C. GL Sharing Contract
In this section, we propose a GL sharing contract to coordinate
the dual-channel model. In a GL sharing contract, the upstream
player (manufacturer) shares the gain or loss incurred by the
downstream player (retailer). Such GL contracts are commonly
observed in the insurance, banking, and third-party logistics
industries [5], [33], [48], [49].
We assume that the manufacturer offers a GL sharing contract
(WL,WG, T ) to the retailer. The parameter T is the retailer’s ex-
pected optimal profit without the contract, which can be thought
of as the retailer’s target profit. At the beginning of the selling
season, the manufacturer sends the quantity QIR to the retailer
at the wholesale price c∗R , as specified in Section IV-D, and
asks the retailer to sell the product at the price pIR . The online
store stocks the quantity QIO and sells at price pIO . At the end
of the selling season, if the retailer’s realized profit is less than
T , then the manufacturer pays the retailer WL times the dif-
ference between the retailer’s realized profit and T . Otherwise,
the retailer pays the manufacturer WG times the difference be-
tween the retailer’s realized profit and T . Notice that, as with the
minimum price-constrained revenue-sharing contract, the issue
arises of whether such a contract is legal, given that the man-
ufacturer attempts to dictate the selling price to the retailer. To
avoid this problem, we take an approach similar to that of [51]
to implement the price constraint without “forcing” the retailers
to participate. Specifically, we assume that the manufacturer of-
fers a menu, with two options, to the retailer upfront. In the first
option, the retailer orders QIR at a wholesale price c∗R , as spec-
ified in Section IV-D, and sets retail price equal to pIR . At the
end of the selling season, the manufacturer shares the retailer’s
gain or loss according to the GL sharing contract. In the second
option, the retailer can order any order quantity at the wholesale
price c∗R and set any retail price. No GL sharing is offered in
this option. As we will demonstrate in the following, the retailer
will earn more profits under the GL contract than without it.
Thus, the retailer will voluntarily choose to participate in the
GL sharing contract.
We next specify some additional notation. Π∗R is the retailer’s
optimal expected profit without the contract, ΠR is the retailer’s
expected profit under the contract, and ΠIR is the retailer’s ex-
pected profit if both parties use the optimal solutions for the
integrated system. The manufacturer’s profits, Π∗M ,ΠM , and
ΠIM , are defined analogously. Also, note that T = Π∗R .
Theorem 10: A GL sharing contract (WL,WG, T ) coordi-
nates the decentralized dual-channel model. If ΠIR > T , then
WG > WL . Otherwise, WL > WG .
Thus, a GL sharing contract will always coordinate the sys-
tem. In the proof of the theorem, we indicate how to determine
values for the contract parameters WL and WG that will en-
sure that the contract is Pareto-improving, i.e., that both the
retailer and manufacturer will benefit from participating in the
contract. The relative size of these gain and loss parameters
WG and WL will depend on the specific problem parameters.
If, in expectation, the retailer does better under the integrated
system than in the dual-channel system with no contract, i.e., if
ΠIR > T = Π
∗
R , then the percentage of the retailer’s gain that
will be shared with the manufacturer WG , in those instances in
which the retailer does better under the contract, will be larger
than the percentage of the retailer’s loss that would be paid to
the retailer by the manufacturer WL in those instances in which
the retailer does worse under the contract.
D. Comparison of Coordinating Contracts
We have presented two contracts, the minimum price-
constrained revenue-sharing contract and the GL sharing con-
tract, that can coordinate the dual-channel model. In addition,
both contracts are completely flexible in dividing system profits
between the players. Depending on the negotiation power of
each party, under either contract, the manufacturer’s profit can
range from Π∗M (i.e., the manufacturer gets no gain from coor-
dination) to ΠIM + ΠIR −Π∗R (i.e., the manufacturer takes all of
the gain from coordination). Similarly, the retailer’s profit can
range from Π∗R to ΠIM + ΠIR −Π∗M . One difference between
the two contracts is the wholesale price. Under the revenue-
sharing contract, the wholesale price is linearly increasing with
the fraction φ of revenue that is kept by the retailer. Under the
GL sharing contract, the wholesale price is fixed at c∗R , the opti-
mal wholesale price in the dual-channel model. The wholesale
price can have a significant impact on a retailer if his cash is
limited prior to the start of the selling season. Therefore, the
revenue-sharing contract could be more attractive to the retailer
than the GL sharing contract if the wholesale price is lower than
c∗R .
VI. NUMERICAL STUDY AND OBSERVATIONS
In this section, we conduct a series of numerical analyses
to investigate the sensitivity of the equilibrium solution for the
dual-channel model to various key parameters, as well as to
compare the performance of the dual-channel model to that
of the integrated system. Since we do not have closed-form
solutions, we find the equilibrium solutions by solving the
problems numerically. After reviewing the existing literature
on channel coordination and demand substitution with a lin-
ear demand model (e.g., [8], [9], and [50]), we created a set
of test problems by varying the key parameters, i.e., the firm’s
own-price sensitivity (αi ∈ {30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80}), the firm’s
competitor-price sensitivity (βi ∈ {0, 3, 6, 9, 12, 15}), and the
unit salvage value (vi ∈ {0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9}). For the ran-
dom component of demand i , we tested uniform distributions
on [0, Bi] for Bi ∈ {50, 100, 150, 200, 250, 300}. The produc-
tion cost (cM ) is normalized at 1, while the base market demand
(δi) is fixed at 2000.
A. Analysis of Dual-Channel Model Equilibrium
We first discuss the behavior of the equilibrium prices, safety
stocks, and profits. We note that the behavior of the equilibrium
is similar across all uniform distributions tested, although the
magnitude of the profits will differ [see Fig. 1(a)]. While we dis-
cuss our general results, we have chosen to graphically display
only selected results.
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(a) (b)
Fig. 1. Graphical illustration of equilibrium behavior. (a) Retailer’s profits. (b) Manufacturer’s wholesale price.
(a) (b)
Fig. 2. Sensitivity analysis on dual-channel model. (a) Manufacturer’s profit. (b) Retailer’s profit.
1) Wholesale price: As shown in Fig. 1(b), the manufac-
turer’s optimal wholesale price decreases as the firm’s
own-price sensitivity increases. However, when demand
is very sensitive to the competitor’s price, the manufac-
turer will set a higher wholesale price. Interestingly, the
manufacturer lowers the wholesale price as the salvage
value increases.
2) Safety stock: As the savage value increases, the safety
stock levels increase, as expected. Higher competitor-price
sensitivity results in higher safety stock for the online
channel but lower safety stock for the retailer. Interest-
ingly, while higher own-price sensitivity reduces the safety
stock for the online channel, it increases the safety stock
for the retailer.
3) Profits: As depicted in Fig. 2, both channels’ optimal prof-
its behave as expected, and as predicted by the analysis of
the deterministic model in Theorem 1. Specifically, as one
firm’s own-price sensitivity increases, its profits decrease.
However, the effect of a firm’s competitor-price sensitivity
is exactly the opposite. Finally, as in a typical newsven-
dor model, a higher salvage value results in higher profits
[refer to Fig. 2(b)].
4) Prices: The impact of these parameters on the optimal
prices is identical to that for the optimal profits, and is
as predicted by the analysis of the deterministic model in
Theorem 1, i.e., firm i’s price is decreasing in its own-
price sensitivity and increasing in the competitor-price
sensitivity. Also, a higher salvage value leads to higher
prices. In addition, as noted previously, we found that
the online price was always less than the retail price.
More specifically, for our parameter values, we found that
p∗O/p
∗
R ∈ [70%, 90%].
Our numerical results provide managerial insights into recent
developments in manufacturer-owned online channels. Since the
manufacturer is the leader of the Stackelberg game, he optimally
chooses the wholesale price to extract the retailer’s profits. As
a result, although we consider only symmetric channels, we
observe that the manufacturer’s profits are significantly higher,
i.e., about seven times (on average) larger, than the retailer’s
profits.
B. Performance of Supply-Chain Coordination
One key question to be addressed in this research is the degree
to which the proposed coordination contracts can improve the
system’s profits. To answer this question, we compare the dual-
channel model with the integrated system for the 1080 problem
settings tested. As expected, the system profits for the integrated
system are higher than for the dual-channel model for every
problem instance. The average percentage increase in profits
under the integrated system is 12.44%, ranging from 6.29% to
14.95%. Note that these increases can be interpreted as the value
of supply-chain coordination.
Further investigation reveals that the value of coordination
increases with the own-price sensitivity and decreases with the
competitor-price sensitivity [see Fig. 3(b)]. These results can be
understood if we consider the behavior of total system profits in
the dual-channel model, as illustrated in Fig. 3(a). Specifically,
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(a) (b)
Fig. 3. Performance of coordination contract. (a) Total profits in dual-channel model. (b) Percentage increase in total profits with coordination.
as consumers become more sensitive to a firm’s own price, the
total system profits in the dual-channel model decrease. There-
fore, there will be more room to improve performance through
supply-chain coordination. In contrast, as the competitor-price
sensitivity increases, and thus the two channels are viewed as
closer substitutes, the total system profits in the dual-channel
model increases and there is less room for improvement through
coordination. In summary, we conclude that coordination is most
critical for products which are highly price sensitive and for sys-
tems in which the online and traditional retail channels are not
viewed as close substitutes, i.e., when consumers have strong
preferences for one type of channel versus the other.
In addition, as predicted by the analysis of the deterministic
model in Theorem 2, both the manufacturer and retailer set lower
prices in the integrated system. On average, pR (pO ) decreases
by 26.52% (1.94%), ranging from 15.68% to 32.04% (0% to
5.05%), respectively. In the integrated system, the retailer can
reduce her price significantly because the manufacturer does not
exercise the Stackelberg leader’s power, i.e., he does not set a
high wholesale price to extract the retailer’s profits. The man-
ufacturer can then also reduce the price for the online channel.
As a result of the decreased prices, the total system demand
increases. The average percentage increase in expected demand
in the integrated system is 28.20%, ranging from 14.10% to
33.18%. Finally, although the safety stock at the retailer zR is
always higher for the integrated system than for the decentral-
ized model, the safety stock at the online store zO is always
slightly lower in the integrated system. However, the total order
quantity (QM = QR + QO ) in the integrated system increases
by 31.21% on average, ranging from 19.73% to 35.88%.
The key to these results is the inefficiency caused by horizon-
tal price competition and vertical double marginalization. While
the online channel only suffers from horizontal price competi-
tion, the retailer incurs inefficiency from both horizontal price
competition and vertical double marginalization. While hori-
zontal competition will by itself tend to lower the retail price,
implying p∗R < pIR , vertical double marginalization will tend
to increase the price, implying p∗R > pIR . Thus, whether p∗R is
greater than or less than pIR depends on the balance between
the vertical and horizontal competition effects. We find that the
vertical double marginalization effect dominates, i.e., p∗R > pIR .
This higher price at the retailer enables the online channel to
also charge a higher price, i.e., p∗O > pIO . Next, we consider the
safety stocks. Since the price for the online store is higher than
the system optimal price, i.e., p∗O > pIO , the newsvendor criti-
cal ratio is higher, and the safety stock held at the online store
will be higher than the system optimal level, i.e., z∗O > zIO . For
the retailer, p∗R > pIR will not necessarily imply that z∗R > zIR
because the effect of vertical double marginalization leads to
lower safety stock at the retailer. From our numerical results,
we find that the latter effect dominates, i.e., the retailer holds
less safety stock than system optimal level, i.e., z∗R < zIR .
VII. MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS
We conclude by discussing the key managerial implications of
this research. We have considered a dual-channel supply chain
in which a manufacturer sells a product to end-users through
both a traditional retail channel and a manufacturer-owned di-
rect online channel. We consider this problem in a newsvendor
setting, in which products are sold for a single selling season.
Thus, our research is particularly relevant in the apparel, pub-
lishing, and electronics industries. The issue of competition in
a dual-channel setting is of increasing relevance in these indus-
tries. Adding a direct online channel has become quite popular
in these industries due to the low barriers to entry, i.e., it is
relatively easy for manufacturers to add a direct online channel
due to recent development in information technology, and the
low setup costs for online stores. The authors in [2] and [5]
provide several examples of manufacturers from the apparel
and electronics industries who participate in such dual-channel
systems.
Given the increased popularity of manufacturer-owned online
channels of distribution, it is important to understand the impact
of this additional channel on the competitive environment. Our
research considers this impact from the perspective of the man-
ufacturer, the retailer, and the consumer. Specifically, we have
demonstrated that adding a manufacturer-owned online channel
can create supply chain conflicts and that ignoring the impact of
the direct channel can reduce the retailer’s profit significantly.
Specifically, since the manufacturer is the leader of the Stackel-
berg game, he will attempt to set the wholesale price to extract all
of the retailer’s profits. As a result, in a supply chain consisting
of a traditional retail channel and a manufacturer-owned online
channel, we would expect the manufacturer’s profits to be sig-
nificantly higher than the retailer’s profits. This is precisely what
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we observe through our numerical analysis (the manufacturer’s
profits are seven times higher, on average, than the retailer’s).
In order to address the supply chain conflict created by the
addition of a manufacturer-owned online channel, we have pro-
posed two coordinating contracts. As discussed in [5] and [6],
the use of supply contracts to improve supply-chain performance
is relatively common in the apparel and electronics industries.
By implementing the coordinating contracts proposed in this
paper, the supply chain can restore its efficiency. In addition,
our proposed contracts can arbitrarily divide the optimal system
profits, allowing the profit allocation between the manufacturer
and retailer to depend on the negotiating power of each party.
Our numerical results demonstrate the value of the proposed
contracts, indicating that coordination can lead to a 6–15% in-
crease in total system profits. Our analysis also provides insights
into when coordination has the most value. We find that coordi-
nation is most beneficial when 1) the products are highly price
sensitive and 2) the two channels of distribution are not viewed
as close substitutes, i.e., where consumers have clear preferences
for one channel versus the other.
Our research also allows us to consider how the channel con-
flict created by the entrance of a manufacturer-owned online
channel, in addition to a traditional retail channel, impacts the
consumer. The results presented in this paper indicate that a
decentralized dual-channel supply chain will have higher prices
on both channels, and a lower total stocking quantity, than will
the coordinated system. Thus, coordination of the dual-channel
system not only improves the profits for the retailer and manu-
facturer, but also makes the consumer better off.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Finally, we highlight some of our theoretical contributions to
the extensive literature on supply chain management. We have
presented a model formulation for a dual-channel supply chain
that has a mixture of simultaneous (Nash) and Stackelberg game
features, in a stochastic model setting with both price and or-
der quantity as decision variables for each channel. We believe
that we are the first to study the problem of coordination in a
dual-channel supply chain in which an independent retailer and a
manufacturer-owned direct online channel engage in price com-
petition. Our model setting allows us to reflect 1) the horizontal
competition between the retailer and the manufacturer-owned
online store; and 2) the manufacturer’s power as the Stackel-
berg leader, setting the wholesale price. For this complex model
setting, we have demonstrated the existence of a unique equilib-
rium and provided insights into the behavior of that equilibrium.
To investigate the inefficiency of the dual-channel system, we
have considered the performance of an integrated system, in
which the supply chain is controlled by a single decision-maker
(the manufacturer). Finally, we have proposed two supply chain
contracts (modified revenue-sharing and GL sharing contracts)
that enable supply-chain coordination. We have shown that such
contracts can coordinate the supply chain and that they can sig-
nificantly improve the system profits.
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